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Background and Summary
In February, 2008, the Third Way, which defi nes itself  
as a “nonprofi t, nonpartisan strategy center for progres-
sives,” released a signifi cant policy statement entitled, 
The Impending Crime Wave. This paper describes the con-
vergence of  what the Third Way conceives of  as four 
new and menacing sociological trends, which, together 
with recent federal disengagement from crime fi ghting, 
allegedly threaten a new and devastating wave of  crime 
in America. The last time this idea surfaced was when 
James Q. Wilson and John DiIulio frightened policy 
makers and the media about a coming wave of  “super-
predators.” A great deal of  bad policy ensued. The basic 
premises of  their arguments and their predictions were 
proven wrong long ago.
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
(NCCD) reviewed the Third Way report and identifi ed 
troubling fl aws with its arguments and with the data 
used to support them. To begin with, NCCD found 
that the described “trends” are based on incorrect data, 
much of  which was drawn from news stories or out-
dated data reports. In addition, the threatening tone of  
the report’s title and language is a deliberate attempt to 
foster fear through the use of  false statements. Also, the 
Third Way fails to indentify the precise age group they 
refer to throughout their arguments. Interestingly, many 
of  the Third Way recommendations are in keeping with 
NCCD’s own values. However, in its 100 years of  his-
tory, NCCD has stood for progressive reforms of  the 
justice system, which have rarely come about by inciting 
public fear. Rather, there is plenty of  rational justifi ca-
tion for reforms that emphasize personal responsibility, 
that are fi scally sound, and that help make the public 
safer.
What follows is an analysis of  the Third Way report; it 
provides evidence from published studies and national 
data, and in some cases California data, and which high-
lights the inaccuracies of  the Third Way’s reasoning.
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Third Way Issue I: 
“The Reentry Explosion”
“Next year, 700,000 people will be released from 
prison.” “Compared to the 1980’s the US will see almost 
three times the number of  prisoners released from 
state and federal prison this decade.” “Based on past 
projections, nearly two-thirds of  ex-prisoners will be 
rearrested within three years of  their release, and this 
group of  individuals alone will be responsible for 9.5 
million new crimes by 2013.”
NCCD’s Facts: 
NCCD agrees that 700,000 reentering prisoners is a 
cause for concern, a call to action, even. However, it is 
misleading to characterize the number as an “explosion” 
on the horizon, as if  it were sudden and unforeseen. 
On the contrary, this is a trend with a history—one that 
is an outgrowth of  bad sentencing policies that came 
about in the fi rst place largely through just the kind of  
political fear mongering that the Third Way appears to 
perpetuate. Moreover, Third Way’s crime projections 
should be scrutinized carefully for accuracy and method. 
The number and rate of  prisoners being released has 
been steadily increasing for more than 30 years. Starting 
in 1973, the rate of  imprisonment took a turn upward 
after having been relatively stable since the early part of  
the century (BJS, 2000). Including the jail population, 
the US incarcerated over 2.3 million people (Harrison 
and Beck, 2006a). The impact of  this growth in incarcer-
ation rates on prisoner reentry is clear—the more people 
we put in prison, the more will eventually come out. 
One crucial area entirely overlooked by the Third Way is 
sentencing and drug policy reforms at the front end. 
In fact, we continue to lock up more people more often, 
despite crime rates on the decline. Rates for both violent 
and nonviolent crime have been on the decline since the 
mid 1990s.
Violent crimes include: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault.
Property crimes include: burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft. Arson 
is also a property crime, but data for arson are not included in property 
crime totals.
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In addition, the proportion of  prisoners locked up for 
drug crime versus property or violent crime has in-
creased dramatically. The trend depicted below has con-
tinued into the current decade. An increasing proportion 
of  released prisoners committed less serious crimes.
Release from federal or state prison, in and of  itself, 
does not necessarily translate into a signifi cant threat to 
public safety. Among state parole discharges in 2000, 
41% successfully completed their term of  supervision; a 
rate relatively unchanged since 1990 (BJS, 2001a).
Furthermore, a prisoner’s impact on public safety varies 
widely with the profi le of  the prisoner. NCCD systemat-
ically reviewed 13 different studies of  accelerated release 
programs for nonviolent offenders to see the impact on 
public safety. In every instance, recidivism rates among 
accelerated release groups and comparison groups were 
comparable. In no instance was there a rise of  new 
crime that one could associate with prisoner release. For 
example: in Illinois, inmates released via Supplemental 
Meritorious Good Time had the same recidivism rates as 
those serving full sentences. In Wisconsin, no evidence 
was found that release 135 days versus 90 days early re-
sulted in a disproportionate increase in criminal activity. 
During 18 months of  follow up, offenders participating 
in the Florida Community Control Program had lower 
rates of  new convictions compared to those that spent 
nine months in prison. To address prison crowding, 
the Illinois Department of  Corrections released 21,000 
prisoners early, reducing the prison population by 10%. 
New crimes by these prisoners were less than 1% of  the 
state’s crimes (Guzman, 2008). 
Third Way Issue II: 
“The Lengthening Shadow of Il-
legal Immigration” 
Third Way’s report refers to the “shadow economy” of  
crime as a result of  the illegal immigration population. 
Third Way paints the portrait of  a small but violent 
minority of  illegal immigrants, immigrant gangs, and 
predators of  illegal immigrants that allegedly pose an 
increasing threat to public safety. 
NCCD’s Facts: 
This argument and its rhetoric are based largely on 
sensational news stories, which create a culture of  fear 
surrounding illegal immigration. Third Way’s argument 
relies heavily (over 50%) on citations from media sourc-
In any case, addressing the reentry issue with reason and 
intelligence requires a solid understanding of  reentering 
prisoners—who they are, what risk they pose to public 
safety, why they fail, and what they need to be success-
ful. 
With California as an example (where all prisoners are 
released on parole), we can look at the crimes that send 
people back to prison. The reader should bear in mind 
that some prisoners return to prison for technical viola-
tions of  their parole, for example, a dirty drug test.
CA Parlole Violators Returned to Prison,                            
by Offense Type, 2006
Source: California Department of  Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2007.
Percent of Releases from State Prison by Most Serious 
Offense, 1985-1999
Source: Bureau of  Justice Statistics, 2001b. 
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es. It is important that any conclusions about the corre-
lation of  illegal immigrants to crime be made from solid 
empirical evidence. 
Recently published studies by scholars have shown that 
immigrants have lower incarceration and crime rates 
than those born in the US. For example, a 2002 study 
in Los Angeles, CA, of  deportable and non-deportable 
aliens found “….no difference in the rearrest rate of  de-
portable and nondeportable aliens in terms of  its occur-
rence, frequency or timing.”  This study further asserts, 
“These fi ndings undermine the ubiquitous assertion that 
deportable aliens are a unique threat to public safety.” 
(Hickman and Suttor, 2008).
From 1994 to 2005 the violent national crime rate and 
property crime rates fell to record lows at the same time 
that immigration increased (Rumbaut and Ewing, 2007). 
Since the late 1990s, border apprehensions as well as 
prosecutions of  employers who hire undocumented 
workers are down, but so are the rates of  violent crime 
and property crime (OIS, 2006). 
Although the number of  illegal immigrants coming to 
the US increased between 1999 and 2005, the number 
of  noncitizens in state and federal detention facili-
ties has remained stable. Since an increase in 1998, the 
number of  noncitizens in state and federal facilities has 
remained stable. In mid-year 2005, 4.2% of  state and 
federal inmates were non-citizens compared to 4.6% 
in 2000 (Harrison and Beck, 2006b). 
The table at left illustrates the percent 
change in violent and property crime 
rates in the six states with the larg-
est undocumented populations. An 
estimated 65% of  all undocumented 
immigrants live in these six states (Pas-
sel et al., 2004). 
It is unlikely that the crime decline is 
even in part a result of  declining ille-
gal immigration. There is no evidence 
that such a decline has occurred.
Third Way Issue III:
“The Sprawling Parentless 
Neighborhood of the Internet”
“Parents once knew who their children were speaking 
with; now many have no idea. Sexual predators were 
limited to cruising neighborhoods in cars; now they surf  
the world online.”
NCCD’s Facts: 
It is unclear precisely what threat Third Way authors 
have in mind. We imagine that they are conjuring the 
threat of  sexual predators going after teens and pre-
teens. Thus, we address the most egregious possibility of  
actual sexual assault. 
In general, the incidence of  sex offenses, including forc-
ible rape, declined between 1997 and 2006. The percent 
change during that period for sex offenses (excluding 
forcible rape) was -13.3%. For forcible rape the decline 
was -20.5% (FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 2006).
Illegal Immi-
grant Population 
Estimates (in 
millions)
States with Highest 
Illegal Immigrant 
Populations
Percent Change                           
 between 2000 and 2006
Violent Crime 
Rate
Property Crime 
Rate
2.4 California -14.3 1.7
1.1 Florida -12.3 -18.4
0.9 Illinois -17.2 -15.8
0.7 New Jersey -8.4 -17.5
0.4 New York -21.5 -19.4
0.4 Texas -5.3 -7.5
Sources: Passel et al., 2004; FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 2006. 
Note: NCCD analyzed data from the above sources. 
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Moreover, most sexual assault occurs among people 
who know each other. In 1997, 68.3% of  sexual assaults 
were perpetrated by someone who knew the victim (BJS, 
1997). Of  women raped or physically assaulted since age 
18, 78% were assaulted by a current or former hus-
band, live-in partner, or date; 17% were victimized by 
an acquaintance; 9% by a relative other than a husband; 
and 14% were assaulted by a stranger (Thoennes and 
Tjaden, 1998). As a matter of  fact, six out of  ten sexual 
assaults occur in the home of  the victim or the home of  
a friend, neighbor, or relative (Greenfeld, 1997). 
Furthermore, according to a publication by the Offi ce 
of  Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP, 
2004), the number of  sexual abuse cases substantiated 
by child protective service agencies dropped a remark-
able 40% between 1992 and 2000, from an estimated 
150,000 cases to 89,500 cases. According to this report, 
“It is possible that the incidence of  sexual abuse has 
declined as a result of  two decades of  prevention, treat-
ment, and aggressive criminal justice activity.”
Third Way Issue IV: 
“The Surging Youth Population”
“For the past 25 years, teens and young adults have 
been the drivers of  America’s crime rates. They have led 
the crime rate up, down, and trending back up again. 
Relative to their size [sic], young people commit more 
crimes than the rest of  the population. Nearly half  of  
those arrested for a violent crime in 2006 were under the 
age of  25. And over the next fi ve years, the number of  
teenagers and young adults in America will increase by 
one million. This youth population surge will increase 
the number of  crimes in America by over two million if  
they simply behave like the national average.”
NCCD’s Facts: 
The assertions that young adults drive the crime rate and 
that there is a population “surge” are very misleading. To 
begin with, according to the 2008 US Census Statistical 
Abstract (2008), the population of  youth ages 15-24 will 
increase to 43,012,848 in 2010 from 42,652,858 in 2006. 
Not only is youth population projected to peak in just 
over a year or two, but youth crime is unlikely to be the 
“driver” of  all national crime rates, especially violent 
crime, as the youth segment declines. 
Regarding the most violent crimes, despite prevalent 
news stories and political postures, juveniles account for 
a small proportion of  murders. In the peak year, 1994, 
the FBI reported that persons under age 18 committed 
10.2% of  all murders. By 1998, juveniles accounted for 
6.3% of  the nation’s homicides (FBI UCR, 1998). 
However, the Census also projects a decrease back down 
to 42,053,168 in 2015 among the youth population. 
Once again, the rhetoric here is infl amed; the concept of  
a “surge” suggests an uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
expansion of  the population. It is true that the youth 
population has increased steadily, along with the growth 
of  the general population. However, the proportion of  
the youth segment with respect to the general popula-
tion has been steadily declining (see graphs below).
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In general, crime rates in California have fallen over the 
last two decades especially for youth under the age of  
25. At the same time, crime increased among adults age 
30 and over (Macallair et al., 2000). Nationally as well, 
in certain categories, teenagers show larger declines and 
smaller increases in rates of  serious offending compared 
to adults. Younger teens and children show the largest 
declines in crime of  any age group, foretelling a more 
law abiding generation (Center on Juvenile and Criminal 
Justice, n.d.).
As a case in point, the trends shown in three decades of  
California crime reports are clear: today’s children and 
teenagers are considerably less crime prone, and today’s 
middle-aged adults are more so than their counterparts 
of  the past. From 2002-2006, youth (under age 18) ar-
rests dropped 3.1%. While it is true that the total num-
ber of  violent crime arrests of  youth increased by 7.6%, 
the property crime rate decreased by a staggering 17.4%. 
Furthermore, in 2006, youth (under age 18) that com-
mitted violent crimes made up only 15.3% of  the total 
arrests for violent crimes (FBI UCR, 2006). 
In California, youth have generally displayed consid-
erably lower rates of  serious crime than that of  the 
late 1980’s and 1990’s. Crime among White youth has 
declined by 20% to 50% over the last 25 years. Black, 
Latino, and Asian youth have shown similar patterns in 
most  types of  crime, but also have shown cyclical pat-
terns of  homicides and violent crime during this same 
period (FBI UCR, 1970-2000). 
Many of  the most notable trends in youth crime have 
gone largely unrecognized by the general public and 
media outlets for more than a decade. Much of  the data 
from state and national crime reports contradicts the 
public image created by numerous authorities, politi-
cians, leading institutions, and the news media of  a 
law-abiding adult generation saddled with inexplicably 
violent, wayward youth (Dorphman, 2001; Center on 
Juvenile and Criminal Justice, n.d.). For example, in 
California, political fi xation on a supposed “youth crime 
epidemic” that never materialized led to policies such 
as Proposition 21, which heightened criminal penalties 
for youth and made it easier to process youth in the 
adult system. California has been left underprepared to 
address a critical aspect of  corrections—tens of  thou-
sands of  aging offenders and prison inmates, many with 
neglected drug problems and declining health, whose 
incarceration, treatment, and medical costs represent a 
fi scal time bomb as well as severe damage to families 
and communities. This situation is playing out in other 
states as well. We desperately need to remove the taint 
of  politics from the basic information used to make 
criminal justice decisions. 
Conclusion
The Third Way report is a collection of  false conten-
tions that attempt to raise public fears about crime, 
immigration, the internet, and youth. NCCD contends 
that there is no call for panic around any of  these issues. 
What is called for is a factual, rational basis for analyz-
ing the needs of  prisoners, the public, youth, and immi-
grants. The US incarceration rate is unnecessarily high. 
Immigration concerns are real, but there is no evidence 
to suggest that immigrants pose a disproportionate 
threat to US citizens. The internet contains everything 
imaginable, however, there is no evidence that it contrib-
utes to the sexual assault of  minors. And youth crime is 
not the key factor in our nation’s crime rates.
NCCD is the country’s oldest private nonprofi t research 
and consulting organization specializing in criminal jus-
tice and juvenile justice. The organization began in 1907 
as the National Probation Association and changed to 
its current name in 1960. NCCD’s mission is to promote 
effective, humane, fair, and economically sound solu-
tions to family, community, and justice problems. NCCD 
conducts research, promotes reform initiatives, and 
seeks to work with individuals, public and private organi-
zations, and the media to prevent and reduce crime and 
delinquency. The organization has been at the forefront 
of  innovative research and policy development in adult 
corrections and juvenile court-related services since its 
inception.  
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